Strategy Against Al-Qaeda Faulted
Report Says Effort Is Not a 'War'

By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, July 30, 2008; A04


The Bush administration's terrorism-fighting strategy has not significantly undermined al-Qaeda's
capabilities, according to a major new study that argues the struggle
against terrorism is better waged by law enforcement agencies than by
armies.
The study by the nonpartisan Rand Corp. also contends that the administration committed a fundamental error in
portraying the conflict with al-Qaeda as a "war on terrorism." The
phrase falsely suggests that there can be a battlefield solution to
terrorism, and symbolically conveys warrior status on terrorists, it
said.
"Terrorists should be perceived and described as criminals, not holy
warriors," authors Seth Jones and Martin Libicki write in "How
Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al-Qaeda," a 200-page
volume released yesterday.
But the authors contend that al-Qaeda has sabotaged itself by
creating ever greater numbers of enemies while not broadening its base
of support. "Al-Qaeda's probability of success in actually overthrowing
any government is close to zero," the report states.
The study was based in part on an analysis of more than 600
terrorist movements tracked over decades by Rand and the Memorial
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism. Jones and Libicki sought to
determine why such movements ultimately die out, and how lessons from
recent history can be applied to the current struggle against al-Qaeda.
The researchers found that more than 40 percent of terrorist
movements fade away when their political objectives are met -- but that
this outcome occurs only when groups are secular and have narrow goals.
By contrast, al-Qaeda's religious and political agenda calls for
nothing less than the overthrow of secular Arab governments and the
establishment of an Islamic caliphate.
A roughly equal number of terrorist groups die when their key
leaders are arrested or killed. In the vast majority of instances, this
is accomplished by local law enforcement, the study notes.
"In most cases, military force isn't the best instrument," said Jones, a terrorism expert and the report's lead author.
Addressing the U.S. campaign against al-Qaeda, the study noted
successes in disrupting terrorist financing, but said the group remains
a formidable foe. Al-Qaeda is "strong and competent," and has succeeded
in carrying out more violent attacks since Sept. 11, 2001, than in all
of its previous history. Moreover, its organizational structure has
adapted and evolved over time, "making it a more dangerous enemy,"
Jones and Libicki wrote.
The authors call for a strategy that includes a greater reliance on
law enforcement and intelligence agencies in disrupting the group's
networks and in arresting its leaders. They say that when military
forces are needed, the emphasis should be on local troops, which
understand the terrain and culture and tend to have greater legitimacy.
In Muslim countries in particular, there should be a "light U.S. military footprint or none at all," the report contends.
"The U.S. military can play a critical role in building indigenous
capacity," it said, "but should generally resist being drawn into
combat operations in Muslim societies, since its presence is likely to
increase terrorist recruitment."